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Public vs. Private Enforcement of International Economic Law:
Of Standing and Remedy
Alan O. Sykes*
Abstract
This paper develops a positive theory of the rules regarding standing and remedy in
international trade and investment agreements. In the investment setting, the paper
argues that a central objective of investment treaties is to reduce the risks confronting
private investors and thereby to lower the cost of capital for capital importing nations.
This objective requires a credible government-to-firm commitment (or signal) that the
capital importer will not engage in expropriation or related practices. A private right of
action for money damages is the best way to make such a commitment. In the trade
setting, by contrast, importing nations have no direct interest in reducing the risks
confronting exporters of goods and services, and will desire to make market access
promises more secure only if such behavior secures reciprocal benefits for their own
exporters. Consequently, commitments in trade agreements are best viewed as
government-to-government rather than government-to-firm. The parties to trade
agreements can enhance their mutual political welfare by declining to enforce
commitments that benefit politically inefficacious exporters, and can most cheaply do so
by reserving to themselves the standing to initiate dispute proceedings—a right to act as
a “political filter.” The paper also suggests why governments may prefer to utilize trade
sanctions rather than money damages as the penalty for breach of a trade agreement.
Like all bodies of law, the public international law of trade and investment
requires an enforcement mechanism. The choices to be made in designing such a
mechanism are many. Parties to trade and investment agreements must decide whether to
create an adjudicative body to hear complaints about alleged breach of obligations, or to
rely on informal diplomacy. They must decide whether to create formal sanctions for
breach of obligations, or to rely on each party’s concern for its reputation, and perhaps
unilateral retaliatory actions, to discourage breach. If they choose to create an
adjudicative body, they must decide who has standing to bring complaints before that
body. And if they choose to create a formal sanction for breach of obligations, they must
select the type of penalty that they will use as well as some mechanism for calibrating its
magnitude.
*
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A fair amount has been written about various aspects of these issues with specific
reference to international economic law, but little has been written from an analytical
perspective about what the law and economics literature terms the choice between public
and private enforcement of law.1 This choice becomes relevant once parties to an
international agreement elect to allow an adjudicative body to hear complaints. They may
then reserve to themselves the exclusive right to petition that body (public enforcement),
or allow private actors with a stake in the dispute to petition it (private enforcement).
Intertwined with that choice is the parties’ choice of a sanction for breach of
obligations—regardless of who has standing before the adjudicative body, the parties to
the pertinent agreement may provide no formal sanctions for a finding of breach, they
may provide for sanctions that only a governmental party to the agreement has the
capacity to administer (such as trade sanctions), or they may provide for money damages
that can be paid to the parties injured by violations
A quick survey of international economic law reveals quite a mixed picture along
these dimensions. Private rights of action for money damages have become routine in
international investment agreements. In the trade area, by contrast, money damages are
much more circumscribed, and provisions for the award of such damages are absent from
important multilateral arrangements (although they are always an option for the
settlement of disputes as a practical matter). Likewise, some trade agreements afford
private actors standing to enforce the rules in a court, while others do not. The goal of
this paper is to explain these features of current law from a political economy
perspective.
In brief, I argue that in the investment arena, the function of international
agreements is to reduce the perceived risk of expropriation and related events for private
firms operating in global capital markets, and thereby to reduce the cost of capital for

1

Exceptions include Levy and Srinivasan (1996), Trachtman and Moremen (2003) and Nzelibe (2005),
all discussed herein.
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capital-importing nations. The most effective mechanism for such risk reduction is a
private right of action for compensatory damages should an importing nation engage in
proscribed behavior.

In the trade arena, by contrast, the function of international

agreements is to make credible government to government commitments regarding trade
policy, and thereby to raise mutual political welfare relative to an environment without
bilateral or multilateral cooperation. For the enforcement of such agreements, it can
suffice to provide standing and remedy only to governments, and indeed a private right of
action for damages may prove politically counterproductive. By reserving standing to
themselves, governments can interpose themselves as “political filters” to exclude certain
enforcement actions that private actors might otherwise wish to bring. In some systems,
the political filtering process may also occur ex post, as through legislative reversal of
politically unpalatable judicial decisions. Regarding the remedy available for breach of
trade agreements, I offer several reasons why governments would prefer to employ trade
sanctions rather than money damages, and in the process rebut the suggestion by other
commentators that trade sanctions are preferred because they are better at coercing
compliance.
Section I sets out relevant characteristics of international trade and investment
law, and reviews existing commentary on private standing and remedies. Section II then
offers a political economy explanation for why investment agreements have private rights
of action, emphasizing the importance to investment agreements of inducing private
actors to incur new sunk costs. Section III considers the heterogeneity among trade
agreements regarding the remedies available to private parties, and explains why
governmental parties to trade agreements may prefer to act as political filters in the
dispute process by reserving standing to themselves, particularly in the absence of a
political body with the power to reverse problematic judicial decisions.
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I. Legal and Economic Background
A. Current Law
1. Investment
The public international law of investment is largely a creation of bilateral
agreements, and to a lesser extent customary international law. The United States, for
example, has relied on a network of bilateral Friendship, Commerce and Navigation
(FCN) Treaties to secure limited rights for investors (as well as certain trade and shipping
rights) in foreign countries throughout much of its history.2 These treaties generally did
not create any private rights of action. It was also long thought that customary
international law provided foreign investors with protection against expropriation,
requiring “prompt, adequate and effective compensation” in the event of any
expropriation. Customary law would afford a private right of action to an investor if the
host country would allow customary law to be enforced against it in its domestic courts,
or would comply with an award by a foreign court.
During the middle of the 20th century, various developing countries began to
question whether customary law obliged them to provide “prompt, adequate and effective
compensation” for expropriation. This movement culminated with the 1974 U.N. Charter
of Economic Rights and Duties of States, adopted by the general Assembly, which
provided that compensation for expropriation was to be measured by the law of the
expropriating state. These developments created considerable unease among investors in
developing countries, and spawned an initiative that began in Europe to negotiate new
“Bilateral Investment Treaties” (BITs). The United States began its own program to
negotiate BITs in 1977.3 BITs typically provide various nondiscrimination commitments,
and expressly embrace the old customary law standard of “prompt, adequate and
2

For illustrative examples of an FCN treaty, one between the United States and Argentina (1853) and one
between the United States and Liberia (1939), see
http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/diplomacy/argentina/argen02.htm
and http://170.110.214.18/tcc/data/commerce_html/TCC_2/LiberiaFriendship.html.
3
For a thorough history, see Vandevelde (1993).
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effective compensation” for expropriation. They provide investors with the right to take
investment disputes to neutral international arbitration, and commit each party to enforce
arbitral awards (including an award of damages).4
Many of the principles found in BITs were incorporated into the investor rights
provisions of NAFTA. Chapter Eleven of NAFTA contains non-discrimination
obligations respecting investment and an obligation to provide prompt compensation for
any “expropriation.”5 It also requires parties to accord investors of another party
“treatment in accordance with international law, including fair and equitable treatment
and full protection and security.”6 Any dispute under these provisions may be submitted
by an investor to arbitration, and the arbitrators have the power to award money damages
and restitution.7
NAFTA Chapter Eleven has sparked a number of interesting cases in recent
years, which have led some public officials and academic commentators to question the
wisdom of the investor rights provisions. I will say more about these controversies
below.
Finally, the OECD’s proposed (and now abandoned) Multilateral Agreement on
Investment also would have included private rights of action for investors. Its provisions
in this regard closely resembled a typical BIT, with investors having the right to proceed
to arbitration and to collect monetary compensation from violator states.8
2. International Trade Law
International trade law is a vast area, encompassing numerous bilateral, regional
and multilateral agreements. It will suffice for my purposes to note four of these
arrangements: the WTO (incorporating GATT); NAFTA; the Treaty Establishing the
4

The U.N. maintains a searchable database of BITs on the UNCTAD website—see
http://www.unctadxi.org/templates/DocSearch____779.aspx. When last visited, the website listed 44 BITS
to which the United States is a party.
5
NAFTA Art. 1110.
6
NAFTA Art. 1105(1). See generally NAFTA Arts. 1102 (national treatment), 1103 (most-favored
nation treatment), 1110 (expropriation and compensation).
7
See NAFTA Art. 1135.
8
The negotiating text of the MAI may be found at 1998 BDIEL AD LEXIS 33.
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European Community (the EC Treaty); and the United States Constitution. I recognize, of
course, that the EC Treaty and the U.S. Constitution are much more than simply “trade
agreements,” but it is their trade-related provisions, as interpreted by their respective high
courts, that are of interest here.
Although these trading arrangements differ in many particulars, they are
strikingly similar as to many core substantive obligations. All four arrangements
expressly limit or eliminate tariffs on trade among their members.9 All four arrangements
place severe limitations on quotas and other quantitative restrictions.10 And all four
systems prohibit discriminatory taxation and regulation that disadvantages commerce
from other member states for the purpose of protecting domestic firms against foreign
competition.11 Many other similarities might be noted.
The four systems differ importantly, however, regarding the standing of private
parties to invoke the rules. Under the law of the WTO, only member governments may
bring disputes into the dispute resolution process. Private parties may lobby their
governments to do so, of course, but the ultimate decision to pursue a case is reserved to
national governments.
Putting aside the investor rights provisions noted above (as well as heretofore
unused private rights of action under the largely meaningless NAFTA side agreements on
labor and the environment), NAFTA also denies standing to private parties. Only the
three member governments can initiate a case to enforce the core trade commitments

9

See GATT Art. II; NAFTA Art. 302; Treaty of Rome Art. 25; U.S. Const. Art. I, Sec. 10.
See GATT Arts. XI & XX; NAFTA Art. 309; Treaty of Rome Arts. 28 & 30. Under the U.S.
Constitution, protectionist quantitative restrictions are prohibited by judicial interpretation, the so-called
“Dormant Commerce Clause.”
11
See GATT Art. III; NAFTA Art. 301. Under the EC Treaty, such discriminatory measures will be
found to have “equivalent effect” to quantitative restrictions, and thus be prohibited under Article 28 unless
they can be justified by certain “mandatory requirements” such as public health. (see Article 30). The
leading case remains Rewe-Zentral AG v. Bundesmonopolverwaltung Fur Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon)
ECJ Case 120/78, [1979] ECR 649. Similar jurisprudence has evolved in the Dormant Commerce Clause
cases in the United States. See David Currie, The Constitution of the United States, Chap. 3.(University of
Chicago Press: 2000).
10
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regarding tariffs, quotas, nondiscrimination commitments, and the like.12
Within Europe, the situation is different. Private interests can resist the
enforcement of laws that violate the EC Treaty in the courts of member states.
Controversial issues may be referred to the European Court of Justice for a ruling, which
the courts of member states treat as binding.13 In an indirect way, therefore, private
parties may be said to have standing to enforce the trade rules of the EC Treaty against
member states that would otherwise violate them.
The United States presents a similar picture. Private actors can challenge state
laws that they believe to violate the trade-related principles of U.S. Constitutional
jurisprudence in state or federal court. A ruling to the effect that a state law in
unconstitutional will ordinarily be accompanied by an order directing state enforcement
authorities not to enforce it.
With regard to the remedy that is available when a party challenging the legality
of a member state law obtains a favorable ruling, the four systems also exhibit some
important differences. The WTO system requires member states adjudged to be in
violation of WTO rules to conform their behavior within a “reasonable period of time.”14
If the member state fails to do so (and the “reasonable period will be fixed by arbitration
if necessary), the complaining member and the violator must negotiate over the
possibility of trade compensation (usually, substitute trade concessions by the violator to
“compensate” for the violation). If those negotiations fail, the complainant may withdraw
trade concessions that it has made to the violator (i.e., retaliate) in an amount
“equivalent” to the harm done by the violation.15 The magnitude of retaliatory suspension
of concessions is also subject to binding arbitration. In cases where the violator conforms
12

To be sure, private parties can appeal certain disputes arising in national administrative agencies to
“binational panels” as an alternative to appellate review in national courts. But these cases simply afford an
alternative mechanism for the enforcement of national law, and do not confer standing on private parties to
enforce principles of NAFTA law per se.
13
See Cassis de Dijon, supra.
14
WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU) Art. 21(3).
15
Some commentators argue that the equivalence requirement can be understood, in a rough way, to
implement a rule of expectation damages. See Sykes (2000).
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its behavior within a “reasonable time,” however, the mainstream view is that the
complainant has no rights to trade compensation or retaliation, or to compensation of any
other sort.16 Some commentators have questioned this proposition, however, finding
precedent in international law for retrospective remedies, and noting that a few dispute
panels (mostly under the old GATT system) have recommended remedies that are
retrospective (such as reimbursement of wrongfully collected antidumping duties). See
Mavroidis (2000).
Further, nothing in the structure of the system prevents WTO members from
“settling” for monetary compensation. Such a settlement has occurred once to my
knowledge, in a case involving a challenge to the U.S. Copyright Act brought by Europe
under the WTO TRIPs agreement. U.S. law did not require the collection of royalties for
music played at certain smaller eating and drinking establishments, and was adjudged to
violate TRIPs. In lieu of amending the Act, the United States ultimately agreed to pay
approximately $1 million per year in compensation to European artists. See Bhala and
Attard (2003). The Copyright case is discussed at length in Grossman and Mavroidis
(2003).
The NAFTA dispute resolution system is quite similar to that of the WTO. Under
Chapter 20, disputes that cannot be settled through consultations are referred to an
arbitral panel. If the panel rules in favor of the complaining member, the losing party
must comply with the ruling, offer compensation to the prevailing party, or else suffer
retaliation in the form of the suspension of “benefits of equivalent effect.” There is no
monetary remedy.
16
One might argue that such a system encourages cheating because there is no penalty for it unless the
cheater is caught and still refuses to stop within a “reasonable time.” No fully satisfactory explanation for
this aspect of the system exists, although Schwartz and Sykes (2002) offer a speculation. They argue that
the bulk of disputes involve good faith differences in interpretation of WTO law, and that litigating such
disputes to conclusion may create an important positive externality in the form of useful precedent for the
hundred-plus other states bound by the same ambiguous “contract.” The rule denying a right of
compensation or retaliation for violations unless cured within a reasonable time encourages parties to
litigate to a final judgment. It may also assist developing countries, whose legal capacities are limited and
who may inadvertently fail to comply with WTO law quite regularly.
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The situation is a bit muddled in Europe, but a damages remedy is available in
some cases against a member state for a violation by that state of its EC treaty. A leading
case on monetary compensation is Francovich v. Italy,17 in which the Court of Justice
held that workers injured by the failure of the Italian government to implement a
Commission Directive to protect workers in bankrupt firms might have an action for
damages against the Italian government. Subsequently, in Brasserie du Pecheur v.
Germany,

18

the Court of Justice ruled that Community Law afforded a right to damages

under three conditions: “the rule of law infringed must be intended to confer rights on
individuals; the breach must be sufficiently serious; and there must be a direct causal link
between the breach…and the damage.”19 The second factor is often the key issue, and the
question whether a breach is “sufficiently serious” turns in significant part on courts’
assessments of whether the national government in question has committed a flagrant
breach of EC law or has instead acted in good faith (albeit illegally) in an area where it
has considerable discretion.20
The situation in the United States has changed somewhat in recent years. Until
fairly recently, cases challenging state laws under the Dormant Commerce Clause sought
only declaratory or injunctive relief. Sitting in the background since the Reconstruction
Era, however, was 42 U.S.C. §1983, which provides for private rights of action against
any “person” who, under “color” of state law, deprives any individual of “any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws” of the United States. The
remedy for a violation of §1983 includes money damages and attorney fees (pursuant to
42 U.S.C. §1988). Only in modern times did litigants begin to advance the theory that
state laws, regulations and administrative actions in violation of the Dormant Commerce

17

(cases C 6 & 9/90) [1992] IRLR 84.
Joined with The Queen v. Secretary of State for Transport, Ex Parte Factortame Ltd., Cases C-46,
48/93, [1996] ECR I-1029.
19
Id. ¶51.
20
See generally George A. Bermann, Roger Goebel, William J. Davey & Elanor M. Fox, European
Union Law, 2d ed., chap. 10 (West: 2002).
18

9

Clause amounted to a violation of §1983. The first decisions rejected this theory, holding
that the Commerce Clause creates no “individual rights” and merely constrains the
activities of states.21 But in Dennis v. Higgins,22 the Supreme Court held that a violation
of the Commerce Clause by a state does give rise to a cause of action under §1983 and to
a claim for attorney fees under §1988. Later decisions by lower courts have awarded
monetary damages for the injuries suffered by private plaintiffs due to Commerce Clause
violations,23 although reported litigation in the area to date is sparse.24
In sum, trade agreements present a mixed landscape on both the issues of standing
and remedy. The two entities considered here with the deepest degree of economic
integration, Europe and the United States, afford some private rights of action to enjoin
member states from enforcing laws and regulations that violate core trade commitments.
Both systems also open the door to monetary remedies to a limited extent. The WTO and
NAFTA do not provide private rights of action with respect to trade commitments, nor do
they provide monetary remedies even for the member governments with standing to
bring cases (although nothing precludes monetary settlements).
B. Prior Commentary on Standing and Remedy in International Economic Law
Recent writing on standing and remedy in the trade and investment areas has
21

See, e.g., Consolidated Freightways Corporation of Delaware v. Kassel, 730 F.2d 1139 (8th Cir. 1984);
J & J Anderson, Inc. v. Erie, 767 F.2d 1469 (10th Cir. 1985).
22
498 U.S. 439 (1991).
23
See Poor Richard's v. Ramsey County, 922 F. Supp. 1387 (D. MN 1996) (awarding approximately
$60,000 plus provable attorney fees for wrongful revocation of a waste disposal license).
24
Among the reasons for the paucity of litigation is the confusing body of precedent regarding what
constitutes a “person” acting under color of law and what “immunities” such “persons” enjoy. Generally
speaking, municipalities are considered “persons” and enjoy no immunity from suit, even when they act in
good faith. However, municipal liability is limited to actions that represent the “policy or custom” of the
municipality. State governments, by contrast, are completely immune from suits for damages unless they
waive their immunity. Individual officials (state or municipal) may be sued in their “individual capacity”
(as distinguished from suits against their government employers), but they enjoy various immunities as
well, ranging from absolute immunity for some functions (like the actions of legislators) to qualified or
good faith immunity for other types of actions. The result of this hodgepodge is that for a plaintiff to
recover money damages from a state, either the state must have waived immunity, or the suit must be
brought against a state official in their “individual capacity” and the plaintiff must overcome whatever
“immunity” is afforded to the defendant. Then, damages may be sought from the individual defendant, and
will be obtained from the state itself only if the state has a policy of indemnifying its employees against
liability. Given all of these potential hurdles, it is no surprise that successful actions for damages appear to
be quite rare. For an introduction to this confusing body of law, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Federal
Jurisdiction , 4th ed., chapter 8 (Aspen: 2003).
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focused on three issues: the wisdom of recent developments in NAFTA investor rights
litigation; the proper role of private parties as amicus curiae in the WTO; and the wisdom
of trade sanctions for violations of WTO law.
Much of the commentary on NAFTA investor rights litigation has been highly
critical of the decisions in cases brought by private parties. The greatest concern is that
the concept of “expropriation” is being applied too elastically, and that “regulatory
takings” are imprudently found to constitute compensable expropriation.25 A case of
particular concern in this context is Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican State,26 which
involved the denial of an environmental permit to a waste disposal site, and resulted in a
$16 million award to the American complainant. Another notable case was S.D. Myers,
Inc. v. Canada, which involved a claim by an American company producing a fuel
additive in Canada that a Canadian ban on inter-provincial trade in the additive was
enacted for protectionist reasons rather than the stated health reasons. Canada settled the
case for $19 million rather than litigate to conclusion.27
Commentators make the point that such decisions imply a far broader “takings”
doctrine under NAFTA than under U.S. domestic law, and generally argue against
compensation for these regulatory takings. Among other things, they contend that the
conventional cost internalization argument for compensation is flawed, and that any
benefits from compensation as “insurance” are available in the private insurance market.
See Been and Beauvais (2003). The same issues feature prominently in earlier literature
on domestic takings. See Epstein (1980); Blume and Rubinfeld (1984). Notwithstanding
25

Another concern was that arbitral panels would read NAFTA Article 1105 broadly, and that its
requirement of “fair and equitable” treatment would become a license to award damages for any
government action that the arbitrators viewed as unfair. Much of the concern here flowed from the
arbitrators reading of Article 1105 in Metalclad Corp. v. United Mexican States, 40 I.L.M. 36 (2001), see
esp. ¶100-01. That issue was perhaps laid to rest by a recent “clarification” adopted by the NAFTA Free
Trade Commission, which stipulates that Art. 1105 requires no more than observance of the customary
international law standard regarding minimum treatment of aliens. See the discussion of the Metalclad case
in John H. Jackson, William J. Davey & Alan O. Sykes, International Economic Relations, 4th ed. (West
2002), 1153-66. [hereafter Jackson, Davey & Sykes].
26
40 I.L.M. 36 (2001).
27
Information on both cases may be found at hhttp://www.naftaclaims.com. Much of the critical
commentary is collected in Brower (2003).
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the critique of individual decisions, however, there has been little or no criticism of
private rights of action in the investment area per se. All of the commentators seem to
accept their wisdom, as long as they are governed by the proper substantive rules.
In the trade area, the absence of private rights of action in the WTO and NAFTA
also seems to be accepted by most of the commentators.28 See, for example, Trachtman
and Moremen (2003). But the United States and many non-governmental organizations
favor a more limited opportunity for private actors to participate in the WTO dispute
process as amicus curiae. In two controversial decisions, the WTO Appellate Body ruled
that dispute panels and the Appellate Body itself could accept such submissions at their
discretion.29 These decisions received a chilly reception from the membership at large,
however, and reportedly only the United States spoke in defense of them before the
Dispute Settlement Body. Developing countries argued that their result was to shift the
balance of power toward the well-funded non-governmental organizations of the
developed world, whose agendas were often at odds with the interests of developing
countries.30 One infers from these events that any proposal for creating private standing
would be roundly rejected by the WTO membership as a whole.
If there has been little advocacy of private standing, there has been much
discussion of changing the remedy for violations of WTO rules. Numerous commentators
have observed that trade sanctions cause substantial welfare losses. See Guzman (2002).
It is considered a puzzle as to why international trade agreements do not use money
damages as a sanction, which are said to constitute “transfers” without the deadweight
costs of trade retaliation. See Guzman (2004). Such observations lead various
commentators to advocate changes in WTO sanctions. Charnovitz (20001 & 2002);
Davey (2001). Prominent practitioners have recently joined the chorus, arguing for
28

But see Shell (1995).
See Jackson, Davey & Sykes, supra, 315-17.
30
See Statement by Uruguay at the General Council Regarding the Decision by the Appellate Body
Concerning Amicus Curiae Briefs, WT/GC/38 (December 12, 2000), excerpted in Jackson, Davey &
Sykes, supra, 303-05.
29
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monetary penalties calibrated to the damages suffered by injured exporters (though
stopping short of advocating a private right of action).31
Another line of commentary pushes in the same direction. It has long been
claimed that developing countries are at a disadvantage in the WTO dispute resolution
process. The explanation usually includes the notion that developing countries have small
markets and are thus unable to affect the prices received by exporters to their markets (in
effect, they lack any “monopsony power” that can be exploited through tariffs).
Consistent with this thesis, Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger (2004) indicate that in not
one instance has a developing country actually exercised its retaliation rights in a WTO
dispute.32 This perceived imbalance of power has led a group of African nations to
propose that monetary penalties be introduced into the system, and has led Mexico to
propose that retaliation rights be subject to auction. See Bagwell, Mavroidis and Staiger
(2003).
A few scholars have weighed in on the other side of this debate, suggesting that
trade retaliation is preferable to monetary remedies because it will be more effective at
inducing compliance with trade commitments. The most thorough exposition of this
argument is that of Nzelibe (2005). See also Goldstein and Martin (2000). I will return to
these arguments below.
II. Investment
This section offers a rationale for the existence of private rights of action for
money damages in investment agreements, a rationale that does not apply to trade
agreements as Section III will demonstrate. As noted earlier, the impetus for modern
BITs (which provide the model for NAFTA Chapter Eleven) was a growing concern

31

See Marco Bronckers and Naboth van den Broek, Trade Retaliation is a Poor Way to Get Even,
Financial Times, June 24, 2004, p. 15.
32
Busch and Reinhardt (2003) look further at the experience of developing countries in WTO dispute
settlement, and contend that they are disadvantaged by their relative incapacity to pursue effective
strategies in the early phases of disputes.
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about the expropriation of foreign investments in developing countries during the mid20th century. The concern reached its zenith when developing countries as a group took
the position in the United Nations that customary law did not require compensation for
expropriation. Investors with sunk investments in those countries faced greater risk, and
had an incentive to lobby their governments for international agreements to reduce it.
This political pressure was the impetus for developed nations to seek to enter BITs with
developing countries.
From the developing countries’ perspective, BITs were a double-edged sword.
They plainly limited the capacity of governments to expropriate existing foreign
investments without compensation, a limitation that worked to their disadvantage, other
things being equal. But they also yielded an important benefit. Investors in developing
countries (as elsewhere) will require a risk premium on their investments to ensure
themselves an expected competitive rate of return. A risk of uncompensated
expropriation thus increases the price of imported capital to developing countries. A
reduction in this risk likewise lowers the cost of foreign capital, which creates rents for
domestic factors of production that work with foreign capital. Those factors will in turn
offer political support for any policy that reduces expropriation risk.33 This explanation
of why many developing countries agreed to BITs is a conventional one in the literature.
See Guzman (1998), Elkins, Guzman and Simmons (2005).34
33

For a simple diagrammatic exposition of the benefits of capital inflow to the country that hosts new
foreign investment, see Peter Lindert, International Economics 9th ed. 547-49 (Irwin: 1991).
34
Guzman (1998) argues that developing countries accepted BITs because they lowered the cost of
foreign capital in this fashion, and made direct foreign investment in the territory of the signatory more
attractive than in the territories of other nations that had not executed BITs. Guzman further argues that the
net effect on BITs on developing countries as a group may have been adverse – if they collectively
possessed monopsony power in the capital market, a policy that permitted uncompensated expropriation
might have allowed them to exploit it. He argues that proposed BITs induced the abandonment of this
collectively valuable policy by forcing each developing nation into a sort of Prisoner’s Dilemma. Each was
tempted to defect from the collectively preferred regime by the prospect of obtaining a competitive
advantage over others, and once they all defected they were collectively worse off than before. Whether or

14

Because a central objective of the investment agreements was to induce foreign
investors to make new investments in developing countries at a lower interest rate, the
utility of a private right of action for money damages is obvious. To see why, consider a
world of BITs without the private action. In the event of an uncompensated expropriation
or similar action, an investor would have to lobby its own government to take some sort
of action against the violator state. The investor might be politically inefficacious in this
process for any number of reasons. It may be unable to offer enough political benefits in
return for the governments’ assistance. Its government may have diplomatic reasons for
declining to take any action, or for declining to retaliate against the violator in any
effective way. And even if some retaliation were forthcoming, it might do nothing to
compensate the investor for its losses. Considerable risk for investors would remain, and
the risk premium on new investments would reflect it. A credible promise of monetary
compensation to investors, by contrast, in an amount set by neutral arbitrators, goes much
farther to reduce investment risk and to achieve the developing countries’ goal of
lowering the cost of foreign capital.
Moreover, for any developing country that does not plan to engage in significant
expropriation or other prohibited activity, a credible promise of monetary compensation
to investors imposes few if any offsetting costs. If expropriation never occurs,
compensation and the attendant litigation costs need never be paid. The possibility of
socially excessive litigation because of a divergence between the private and social costs
of suit—a concern explored in Section III below—is then minimal. A promise of
monetary compensation to investors is thus a cheap commitment device for states with
benign intentions toward investors, and a cheap way for states with more benign
not Guzman is correct in this account, it seems that on any account the developing countries accepted BITs
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intentions than others to signal their “type.” As long as the capital importing nation is
confident that it does no wish to engage in prohibited behavior, therefore, the private
right of action on behalf of foreign investors is not a burden on it but a clear benefit.
Implications: The NAFTA Chapter Eleven Controversy. The explanation
developed here for private rights of action under investment agreements offers some
additional support to the argument of Been and Beauvais (2003) that a “regulatory
takings” doctrine under NAFTA Chapter Eleven is undesirable. The commitment by a
developing country to a private right of action for investors is a low-cost commitment or
signal that it will respect investors’ property rights only to the extent that “expropriation”
is defined to include acts that the national government is unlikely to want to undertake.
An expansive regulatory takings doctrine, by contrast, can sweep in many acts of
“expropriation” that arguably result from the resolution of regulatory uncertainty (like the
denial of the environmental operating permit in Metalclad) or the emergence of new
information about the subject of regulation (such as the health issues associated with the
gasoline additive in S.D. Myers).35
Been and Beauvais note that such regulatory policy changes typically do not
confer private rights of action for damages under U.S. law, and it seems unlikely that
developing countries would wish to provide broader “insurance’ against regulatory policy
changes. The extensive literature on legal transitions suggests that compensation for
policy changes (or insurance against them) can encourage over-reliance on policies that
may change, and may chill desirable change as well. See, e.g., Kaplow (1986b); Shaviro
(2000). Further, the capacity of international dispute panels accurately to distinguish
because of their desire to lower the cost of foreign capital.
35
I stipulate that some commentators have a less benign view of the actions of the respective
governments in those cases, and take no position on the ultimate merits of either case.
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well-intentioned or desirable regulatory policies from those driven by protectionism or
other forms of capture is limited. The tendency in international law is to restrict the
scrutiny of domestic regulation by international dispute panels to fairly narrow issues
such as the presence of clear discrimination or the violation of various procedural
requirements, and to foreclose open-ended inquiry into the wisdom or legitimacy or
regulation through cost-benefit balancing and the like. See Sykes (1999, 2003),
Trebilcock and Soloway (2002). An open-ended “expropriation” doctrine that permits
challenges to regulatory outcomes under investment agreements would thus stand in
contrast to the treatment of national regulation in other areas of international economic
law, a fact that casts additional doubt on the wisdom of compensation for regulatory
takings under NAFTA.
III. International Trade
The (capital) importing nation that is party to an investment agreement wishes to
commit or signal to private (capital) exporters that their investments are secure against
government interference. The private right of action for compensatory damages
facilitates this government-to-firm commitment, in a way that a mere government-togovernment commitment cannot. Trade agreements are different in an important way—
(goods and services) importing nations have no direct interest in making (goods and
services) exporters more secure or confident that market access commitments will be
respected. An importing nation, call it A, will make commitments that benefit exporters
in another nation, call it B, only to the degree that the government of B will make
reciprocal commitments that benefit A’s exporters. For this reason, trade agreements are
better structured as government-to-government commitments, and a private right of
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action for damages may actually be counterproductive.36 Indeed, private standing
irrespective of the remedy may be counterproductive. Section A develops this argument.
Even if standing under trade agreements is best limited to governments, it remains
to consider what remedy the agreement should select. Section B offer several new
reasons why trade sanctions might be preferred to money damages, despite what some
commentators note as the apparent inefficiency of trade sanctions.
A. Standing
The political rationale for trade agreements differs importantly from the rationale
for investment agreements. In the absence of trade agreements, trade policy reflects the
political equilibrium between the interest groups opposed to imports (domestic importcompeting industries) and interest groups that favor imports (domestic import-consuming
industries and consumers). Export industries have only a modest stake in policy, reflected
in the degree to which a more restrictive import policy may result in some retaliation
against them by foreign governments acting unilaterally. When trade agreements become
possible, by contrast, nations can negotiate reductions in their trade barriers in exchange
for reciprocal reductions by others. Exporters thus have a more direct stake in policy, and
will lobby their home governments to secure market access concessions abroad. The new
political equilibrium will result in a more open trading system.
Unlike the situation with investment agreements, importing nations do not enter
trade agreements out of a desire to lower the price of imports. They view any reduction in
their own trade barriers, and the attendant price of their imports, as a “concession” that is
36

The proposition that trade agreements arise to facilitate government-to-government market access
commitments is a standard one in the modern economics literature. See, e.g., Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
A smaller strand of literature, however, explores whether trade agreements may also facilitate valuable
commitments by governments to their domestic firms. Because such theories do not suggest any role for
private rights of action by foreign firms, however, I do not address them here. Useful references include
Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare (1998) and Staiger and Tabellini (1999).
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only tolerable in return for concessions by trading partners. Holding constant the
concessions by trading partners, therefore, importing nations will prefer that foreign
exporters face greater risk regarding the security of market access commitments. Indeed,
importing nations would gladly reimpose their barriers to imports if they could do so
without suffering any retaliation or punishment by foreign governments. From the
importing nations’ perspective, therefore, a private right of action to compensate foreign
exporters for violations of trade agreements is undesirable, other things being equal.
The reader may well observe, however, that even if there is little desire by the
governments of importing nations to make their own market access concessions more
secure, every importing nation is also an exporting nation. Exporters value secure market
access commitments (or a promise of compensation should they be withdrawn), at least
to the degree that the risks associated with their withdrawal cannot be priced up front to
ensure an expected competitive return on investment. As in the investment area,
therefore, exporters with sunk investments (or inelastically supplied factors of production
that earn inframarginal rents), the returns to which would be threatened by the violation
of trade agreements, might be expected to lobby their governments for a private right of
action on their behalf.37
The distinction identified thus far between investment agreements and trade
agreements may be summarized as in Table 1:

37

There is perhaps a shade of difference between the investment and trade areas in this regard, because
the impetus for modern investment agreements arose during a time when developing countries were
retreating from their commitment to compensate for expropriation and related actions. This retreat may
have been unanticipated by many investors and may thus have threatened the quasi rents on substantial
amounts of sunk investment, leading to especially strong political pressure for measures to restore the
previous commitment by developing countries to compensation. Liberalization in the trade area has
proceeded steadily, by contrast, and exporters never enjoyed a private right of action. The degree to which
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Importing Nation
Derives Utility from
More Secure Commitments
to Exporters
Investment
Trade

Yes
No

Exporting Nation
Derives Utility from
More Secure Commitments
to Exporters
Yes
Yes

Table 1
The private damages action, which makes exporters more secure, is critical to achieving
the goals of the importing nation in the investment area, but objectionable to the
importing nation in the trade area. This key difference suggests that the private damages
action will be more attractive to states contemplating an investment agreement. The
distinction drawn here, however, is insufficient to establish that the private damages
action will not also be attractive (if less so) to states contemplating a trade agreement. I
now turn to some further considerations that weigh against the private damages action in
the trade area.
The Value of Political Filters. Recall the fact that goods and services importing
nations are interested in making commitments that benefit foreign exporters only if they
result in reciprocal commitments to benefit their own exporters. Likewise, an importing
nation may have little interest in honoring a previously-made commitment to a foreign
exporter unless the violation of that commitment would result in some detriment to its
own exporters, perhaps in the form of direct retaliation or at least some damage to the
importing nation’s reputation that would harm its ability to secure future trade
commitments. This fact suggests the virtue for trade agreements of what I will term a
“political filter.”
To elaborate, a central tenet of public choice theory is that some interest groups

sunk investments have been threatened by potential violations of trade agreements may be more modest,
therefore, although this point is surely somewhat speculative.
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are better organized than others, and thus better able to influence the political process.
Indeed, this observation affords the standard explanation for protectionist trade policies,
which (perhaps with rare exception) lower the national economic welfare of nations that
employ them—the harm from protectionist policy is often borne by a diffuse group of
poorly-organized consumers, while the benefits inure to well-organized importcompeting industries.
Not all industries are equally well organized either. Industries comprised of a
large number of small producers, for example, may have difficulty overcoming the
transaction costs and free rider problems associated with efforts to influence the political
process. Industries with a few larger firms may be better able to overcome free rider
problems and transaction costs, by contrast, and individual firms in such industries may
have high enough stakes in the outcome of policy decisions that they are willing to incur
the costs of acting alone to influence political representatives.
Thus, consider some generally applicable legal rule under a trade agreement, such
as a requirement that forbids regulatory measures that discriminate against foreign
commerce (the “national treatment” obligation in WTO parlance), and imagine that a
party to a trade agreement has violated that obligation. In the absence of any private
standing to enforce the rule, political officials in the nation whose exporters are
aggrieved by the violation must decide whether to bring a compliance action themselves.
If the violation affects a well-organized export industry, officials may expect significant
political rewards from such an action. If the violation affects a poorly-organized industry,
by contrast, they may expect few political rewards from bringing the enforcement action.
The violation of the national treatment rule will also have political consequences
for officials in the violating state. An inadvertent violation that confers rents on a poorly-
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organized import-competing industry, for example, will generate little political support
for those officials. But if the violation confers substantial rents on a well-organized
import-competing industry, it may be a source of considerable political benefits to the
officials who can claim credit for it. These observations suggest that the political officials
who become parties to trade agreements can enhance their mutual welfare by retaining
the right to determine which enforcement actions are brought.
The basic idea can be formalized very simply as follows: Consider two states, A
and B (although the analysis readily generalizes to the multilateral case). Assume for
simplicity that states are unitary actors, each with a “political utility” function—let U()
denote the utility function for A and V() denote the utility function for B. Each function
is additive and its arguments will become clear in a moment.
Industries in each state may be divided into two categories, exporting industries
and import-competing industries. State A has comparative advantage in the set of
industries that export to B, call them industries in the set AB, with its members denoted
αi, i = 1 to n. State B has comparative advantage in the industries that export to A, call
them industries in the set BA, with its members denoted βj, j = 1 to m.
States A and B have entered a trade agreement, which contains some generally
applicable legal rule (say, national treatment). Import-competing industries in each state
do not like the national treatment rule (which forecloses a range of protectionist policies
that could benefit them), while exporting industries in each state benefit from the national
treatment rule. Political officials in state A can thus gain political utility from a national
treatment rule that is enforced for industries in AB, and but will suffer a loss of political
utility from a national treatment rule that is enforced for industries in BA. Let u(αi)
denote the political benefit derived by officials in state A from the enforcement of the
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national treatment rule in (its exporting) industry αi, and let u(βj) be the political
detriment suffered by officials in state A from the enforcement of the national treatment
rule in (its import-competing) industry βj. Choose the utility scale so that u(αi) ≥ 0, all
α, and u(βj) ≤ 0, all β.
The situation in state B is exactly the opposite. Let v(αi) denote the political
detriment suffered by officials in state B from the enforcement of a national treatment
rule in (its import-competing) industry αi, and let u(βj) be the political benefit derived by
officials in state A from the enforcement of the national treatment rule in (its export)
industry βj. Choose the utility scale so that v(αi) ≤ 0, all i, and v(βj) ≥ 0, all j.
If the national treatment rule is enforced in all industries, officials in each state
enjoy total utility equal to the sum of their respective utilities from enforcement in each
industry:
U = Σi=1…nu(αi) + Σj=1…mu(βj) and V = Σi=1…nv(αi) + Σj=1…mv(βj).
But the parties can almost certainly do better. Imagine that some exporters in state
A are very poorly organized, say, those in industry α2. Suppose for simplicity that
u(α2)=0. But imagine that the import-competing firms in state B are better-organized, so
that v(α2) < 0. The parties to the trade agreement would then experience a (political)
Pareto improvement if they agreed not to enforce the national treatment rule in industry
α2—officials in state A would be no worse off, while officials in state B would enjoy
utility gains.
The point is much more general, and does not depend on the presence of export
industries for which the political utility of enforcement is zero (indeed the utility scale is
completely arbitrary). State A can agree to forego enforcement of the national treatment
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rule on behalf of its industries where the political gains to its officials are “small” and the
political costs to officials abroad are “large,” while state B can make a reciprocal
promise. The political costs in each state from foregone enforcement on behalf of export
industries under such an arrangement can be far outweighed by the political gains from
foregone enforcement in politically powerful import-competing industries.
One can take the analysis a step further and imagine that the parties write an
elaborate contingent contract, specifying industry-by-industry where the national
treatment rule applies and where it does not. Sykes (1991) solves a mathematically
analogous continuous problem (here one might imagine a continuum of industries). For
present purposes, it is enough to note that the solution has the following properties: For
any point on the parties’ Pareto frontier (and thus associated with an optimal treaty), a
shadow price exists that allows units of each party’s utility to be converted into units of
the other’s utility. An optimal treaty will provide that the parties forego enforcement of
the national treatment rule (or any other rule, for that matter) in any industry for which
the political utility gain to officials in the violator state “outweighs” the political utility
loss to officials in the state harmed by the violation, using the treaty’s shadow price to
convert utilities into the same units.
A detailed contingent contract of that sort would be extremely costly to write,
however, especially given the wide array of rules found in modern trade agreements. The
parties may thus prefer cruder and cheaper rules. A simple rule with considerable
potential appeal is that parties will not bring enforcement actions on behalf of politically
weak industries. As long as the poorly-organized export industries in state A are not as
poorly organized on average in state B, and vice-versa, an exchange of reciprocal
promises to forego enforcement on behalf of poorly-organized industries can leave both
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sides at a considerably higher level of utility.
How might the parties implement such a rule? The obvious way is to omit any
private rights of action from their agreement. Because it is costly for the parties to bring
enforcement actions themselves, they will only bring actions on behalf of exporters who
offer sufficient political rewards in exchange. It is precisely the group of politically
weakest exporters whose cases will be ignored under this arrangement.
It is perhaps instructive here to note how the investment situation is different.
Because the goal of the capital importing nation is to lower its cost of capital, it has an
interest in assuring all capital exporters that it will respect their investor rights, not just
the ones who are politically efficacious in their home countries. The reason is the
distinction emphasized earlier—capital importing countries benefit directly from making
foreign exporters more secure, but goods and services importing countries only benefit to
the extent that foreign exporters reward their governments for greater security and induce
them to grant reciprocal commitments.
Two further considerations support this general line of analysis. First, in newer
trade agreements such as NAFTA and much of the WTO, each member state confronts a
number of transition issues. The task of ferreting out all national and sub-national
regulation that might run afoul of the WTO Technical Barriers Agreement, the Sanitary
and Phytosanitary Measures Agreement, and so on, is not a trivial one. Thousands of
regulatory measures are potentially in play (especially after the WTO agreement made
clear that its obligations apply to state and local regulation as well as national regulation),
and many nations may be constrained in their capacity to make conforming changes
quickly (especially developing countries). In the face of many potential “transition”
violations, therefore, the parties may well desire to limit enforcement actions to those of
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the greatest political importance to aggrieved exporters. Private rights of action, by
contrast, might tax the resources of nations seeking to comply with their obligations, and
distort the timing of the compliance agenda (from the standpoint of maximizing joint
political gains). This problem is likely to be far less acute in the investment area, where
the basic rules have been established for a long time (although NAFTA decisions have
shaken them up, perhaps unwisely, as noted earlier).
Second, legal interpretations developed in one case inevitably have consequences
for others. Officials concerned with their political welfare must worry that precedents
established in an enforcement action brought on behalf of their exporters will come back
to haunt them in an action brought against them by foreign exporters. Only by reserving
standing to themselves, and thereby retaining control over the arguments put forward in
litigation, can officials ensure that their export interests do not advance legal theories that
are lacking in “net” political value. The same issue can arise in the investment arena, to
be sure, and one might interpret the uneasy reaction of NAFTA member governments to
recent decisions as a manifestation of this problem. Trachtman and Moremen (2003)
make a similar point. Levy and Srinivasan (1996) make the related point that private
actors may bring actions when, for diplomatic reasons, their governments might prefer
forbearance.
Objections. One possible objection to this line of reasoning is that it ignores the
resources that political officials must expend to bring compliance actions. Perhaps the
direct costs of briefing and arguing cases, and the related expenses of deciding which
claims to bring, more than offset the benefits from the “political filter” mechanism
outlined above.
Although this objection surely raises a logical possibility, it should not be
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exaggerated. As a practical matter, governments can (if they wish) push much of the cost
of compliance actions back onto the private sector. Indeed, it is routine in WTO practice
for the private interests who seek compliance actions on their behalf to supply legal
assistance for the purpose of developing the legal analysis, writing briefs, and the like.
Nations could also agree to allow privately funded counsel to argue the cases (although
neither NAFTA or WTO practice allows private parties to appear at present). It is simply
not the case, therefore, that governments must bear high litigation costs when they
choose to act as a political filter.
A second possible objection is that the analysis proves too much. If governments
can gain by interposing themselves as political filters between private interests and the
dispute resolution process under trade agreements, why do private rights of action
emerge in some contexts nevertheless? As noted earlier, both the European Union and the
U.S. constitutional system afford limited private rights of action to parties aggrieved by
violations of trade rules.
A partial explanation for the disparity across systems is that private rights of
action may not have been contemplated by the framers of either the U.S. Constitution or
the EC Treaty. In the United States, the important “free trade” principles associated with
the Dormant Commerce Clause were developed by the Supreme Court years after the
Constitution was written. Likewise, the modern powers of the European Court of Justice
in the trade area may not have been anticipated during the founding period, and decisions
such as Cassis de Dijon, analogizing regulatory trade barriers to measures having an
“equivalent effect” to quantitative restrictions, may have come as a surprise. Private
rights of action in each system may thus be an unanticipated creation of the courts rather
than a mechanism desired by the political founders.
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Even if this suggestion is correct, however, it is at best an incomplete answer to
the puzzle. Had private rights of action been viewed as seriously problematic in either
system, political actors could have changed the law to extinguish them. This observation
suggests a second important consideration bearing on the wisdom of private rights of
action.
Ex Post Political Oversight. Both Europe and the United States have political
bodies (the Congress and the EC Commission) with the capacity to address sensitive
trade matters directly. NAFTA and the WTO do not have such bodies—only a costly
process of amending the pertinent treaty text, which requires unanimous acceptance, can
override judicial decisions that political actors find unpalatable.
The presence of a body like the Congress or the Commission reduces the value of
interposing a political filter at the front end of the dispute resolution process. As long as
the body has not lost too much flexibility to constitutional rules that it cannot change, it
can handle the most politically charged matters directly, and can correct judicial
decisions that become politically unacceptable over time (decisions under the Dormant
Commerce Clause in the United States, for example, can always be overridden by an
affirmative exercise of the Commerce power). In such a system, the danger of politically
objectionable judicial decisions surviving for any length of time is much less, and the
opportunity to shift the costs of bringing cases onto the private sector is more attractive.
Put differently, bodies like the Congress and the Commission can serve as ex post
political filters, undoing the undesirable decisions while avoiding the costs of sorting the
larger number of cases that arise ex ante.
A possible objection to this line of reasoning, however, is that constitutional
restrictions may preclude Congress and the Commission from discriminating among

28

industries in a politically desirable fashion. The Equal Protection clause of the U.S.
Constitution, for example, likely precludes policies that treat industries differently solely
in accordance with their political efficacy (some other “rational basis” is almost certainly
required to justify disparate treatment). An ex ante political filter may have the advantage
of circumventing such “bothersome” legal constraints. Still, the ex post mechanism has a
potentially sizeable cost advantage that may on balance favor private standing.
B. Remedy: Trade Sanctions and Money Damages
Regardless of the rules governing the standing of private parties, some remedy
must be made available to parties who have standing. We thus return to the puzzle of
why trade agreements such as NAFTA and the WTO select the seemingly inefficient
remedy of trade sanctions with their attendant deadweight costs, in preference to a
remedy like money damages that is a mere “transfer.”
As noted at the outset, nothing in the current law of NAFTA or the WTO
precludes the use of monetary payments to resolve disputes. “Compensation” is
allowable (and indeed preferred) to trade retaliation, and nothing restricts the form that
compensation might take. Yet, with very rare exception, WTO and NAFTA cases are not
settled in this fashion (putting aside NAFTA investor rights cases). Thus, by “revealed
preference” of sorts, we must infer that trade retaliation is preferred in general by violator
states to the alternative option of money compensation, at least given the implicit
reservation prices of complainants. This section suggests a few considerations that may
help explain this state of affairs. Before turning to those issues, however, I wish to rebut
one argument that has appeared elsewhere.
Are Trade Sanctions Preferred Because They Better Induce Compliance with
Trade Agreements? As noted earlier, some scholars, most notably Nzelibe (2005), have
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argued that trade agreements utilize trade sanctions rather than money damages because
the sanctions mechanism is more effective at inducing parties to comply with their
commitments. Trade retaliation can be targeted at powerful export groups in the violator
country, the argument runs, which will motivate them to encourage their government to
cease the violation. Likewise, trade retaliation provides at least temporary benefits to
import-competing firms that compete with the imports that are targeted. Their political
support for retaliation makes the use of the retaliatory sanction a credible threat. Money
damages, it is argued, are inferior in both respects. Their costs are borne by a diffuse
group of taxpayers in the violator state, who will not organize to lobby their government
to avoid monetary liability—money is too “cheap” from the perspective of the violator
state for monetary penalties to be an effective deterrent to misconduct. Further, the
beneficiary of a monetary sanction will be the national treasury of the complaining state,
and no interest group in that state will have much interest in pushing for its government
to pursue the sanction.
I find this line of reasoning unconvincing for two reasons. First, to the degree that
damages are a “cheap” penalty from the perspective of violators, they can always be
increased. At some point, monetary penalties would become a sufficient burden on the
treasury of even the wealthiest trading nations that a violator nation would prefer to
comply with its commitments rather than to pay damages, and the prospect of collecting
the money would be an appealing prospect for potential complainants. The claim that
damages will not induce compliance, therefore, must be modified to something like the
following: compensatory damages (perhaps measured by the loss of rents to foreign
exporters injured by the violation) will not suffice to induce nations to comply with their
commitments.
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Even this modified claim is problematic, for it implies that parties to trade
agreements should actually prefer to utilize a compensatory damages remedy. To see
why, assume, arguendo, that the claim is correct. Then, parties prefer a state of the world
in which they violate the rules and pay compensatory damages, to state of the world in
which they comply with their commitments and avoid damages. If this is true, however,
then there is a clear opportunity for efficient breach (in a political sense), and the parties
could enjoy Pareto gains by incorporating a compensatory damages remedy into the
agreement. Violators by hypothesis enjoy higher utility even when bearing the cost of
damages, and injured exporters should be indifferent between compliance with the
agreement and full compensation for violations. Under these circumstances, a trade
retaliation remedy that sufficed to induced compliance would eliminate this source of
joint gains, and it would not be in the mutual interest of the parties to employ it.
The suggestion that trade retaliation is preferred over damages in trade
agreements because it is a more effective mechanism for inducing compliance thus
suffers from two logical problems. It is not a convincing rationale for the widespread use
of trade retaliation in my view. I now turn to some other considerations that weigh
against monetary remedies.
Are Monetary Remedies a Mere “Transfer?” The claim that money damages are
a simple transfer is misleading for one well-known reason and one perhaps not so wellknown. First, governments face budget constraints, and must finance money damages
through taxation. Putting aside “lump sum” taxes, oft invoked by economists but hardly
ever used in practice, taxes create their own distortions. The choice between trade
sanctions and money damages then is not a simple choice between a mechanism that
creates welfare costs and one that does not. And although it may well be true that
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methods to raise the money for a damages award can be found that cause less distortion
than the trade sanctions for which the award substitutes, the magnitude of the difference
need not be dramatic. This may be especially true in developing countries, some of which
still rely heavily on trade taxes to raise funds for their national treasuries—trade
sanctions against them raise inefficient barriers to their exports, but monetary awards
against them might well force an increase in inefficient tariffs on their imports (which
might even hurt the exporters from the complaining nation).
Second, the claim that money damages are a simple transfer neglects the lessons
of the economic literature on the private versus social value of litigation. Landes and
Posner (1975) note that the Becker/Stigler prescription in the criminal law area for higher
penalties and lower probabilities of sanction (to save on administrative costs) becomes
problematic if private enforcers could collect the higher penalties—increases in the
penalty may induce more expenditure on enforcement rather than less. See also Polinsky
(1980). In the same spirit, Shavell (1982) explores the difference between the private
incentive to file civil claims for damages, and their social value, in a tort setting. The
social return to a prospective lawsuit is the value of the ex ante change in risky behavior,
which can be measured by the reduction in the expected costs of accidents induced by
prospective liability. The social cost of a lawsuit is its litigation cost—the damages
payment from a defendant to a plaintiff is simply a transfer. Because there is no
necessary relationship between the damages payment (and the attendant incentive to file
suit) on the one hand, and the social gains from prospective liability on the other,
litigation may occur too often or too infrequently from an economic standpoint. The
analysis is refined somewhat in Menell (1983) and Kaplow (1986a), but the essential
point remains the same. See also Shavell (2004).
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These insights have potentially important implications for the wisdom of private damages
actions in international economic law. The social gains from such actions and the private
gains may be quite different. Consider a simple illustration. Figure I depicts a market for
imported goods in some importing state. The curve Is is the import supply curve,
reflecting the quantity of imports available to the state in question at each price. The
curve Id is an import demand curve, constructed from the excess of domestic demand
over domestic supply for the good in question at every price. Assume that a pertinent
trade agreement requires “free” trade, which would produce an equilibrium price Pf and

Figure I
quantity of imports Qf where Is and Id intersect. But the importing nation violates the
agreement, and imposes a tax of t on imported goods, yielding an equilibrium price to
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domestic consumers of Pv and net price to foreign sellers of Pv-t; import quantity drops to
Qv. The deadweight cost of the violation in this simple framework is equal to the area
abd. The rectangle Pvdb(Pv–t) is tax revenue.
Consider the incentives to file a case under these assumptions. Foreign sellers
lose surplus in the amount Pfab(Pv–t). If the case will succeed with certainty, they will
bring it as long as their litigation costs do not exceed this value. Because their gains from
suit exceed the deadweight cost [triangle acd appears to be considerably smaller than
rectangle Pfcb(Pv-t)], the distinct possibility arises that foreign sellers will file a case even
if their litigation costs would exceed the social gains from correcting the violation. And if
foreign sellers do not bear the litigation costs of the violator state and the tribunal (as in
NAFTA or the WTO), there is an even greater danger that a case will be filed even
though the social costs of litigation exceed the gains from correcting the violation.38
The analysis is not quite so simple, however, because the mere threat of litigation
may deter the violation in the first place. If violations never occur, and thus litigation
never ensues, the danger of socially excessive litigation evaporates. This point is akin to
the observation in Shavell (2004) that the danger of socially excessive tort litigation is
diminished when injurers are subject to a negligence rule rather than a strict liability rule,
and can avoid suit by exercising due care.
It follows that the efficiency of private damages actions for violations of trade
agreements turns, inter alia, on two empirical questions. First, when violations occur,
how will the likely costs of litigation compare to the social gains of correcting the
violation (assuming litigation will lead to its correction)? Second, to what extent will the
prospect of private damages actions deter violations altogether?
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Regarding the first question, Figure I hints at a potentially important general
concern. Many violations of trade agreements result in large transfers—tax revenue for
the government at the expense of foreign producers and domestic consumers, quota rents
to domestic importers who hold importation rights at the expense of foreign producers
and domestic consumers, producer surplus for favored trading partners at the expense of
other trading partners who are discriminated against, and so on. Deadweight losses arise
in all of these scenarios to be sure, but they may be much smaller than the transfers away
from injured foreign exporters. Such situations present a clear danger of socially
excessive litigation costs. The problem is all the more acute, of course, to the degree that
nations would prefer to pay damages in perpetuity than to conform their behavior, a
possibility that cannot be completely discounted.
Regarding the second question, it is questionable whether trading nations can
avoid litigation costs by simply “complying” with the rules. Flagrant cheating occurs in
the system to be sure, but many disputes involve good faith disputes over the
interpretation of legal obligations or the application of legal principles to the facts. Many
violations may simply be “accidental,” especially by developing countries with limited
compliance capacity. In other cases, the law is unclear or its application under the
circumstances is fairly debatable—trading nations can then “comply” with the rules only
by abandoning potentially legitimate policies, and they may be unlikely to do so in many
cases.
Money Damages and Developing Countries. Developing countries might be quite
threatened by a system of monetary damages, at least if they were calibrated to
compensate foreign exporters for the damages they suffer due to illegal acts. Many
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developing countries regularly suffer severe shortages of hard currency, and will be hardpressed to pay significant damages in any currency that they cannot print. And because
their legal infrastructure is often weak, their ability to avoid damages judgments by
simply “complying” with the law is limited as noted above—indeed, within the WTO,
developing countries often complain that they do not fully understand how to implement
their obligations, and seek assistance for “capacity-building” in this regard. Monetary
damages might thus produce a significant chill on their domestic regulatory initiatives,
and expose them to considerable liability for inadvertent violations.
Although some developing countries have nevertheless suggested that a monetary
remedy be introduced into WTO law as noted earlier, Davey (2001) explains the nature
of the remedy that they have in mind. They do not advocate a system of “compensatory
damages,” but a sliding scale system of fines set on the basis of factors such as GDP and
per capita income. Mexico’s proposal for auctioned retaliation rights provides similar
protection to the treasuries of developing countries, in that no nation would be compelled
to participate in any auction. Existing proposals for monetary remedies, therefore, are
aimed at imposing substantial monetary costs on violations by wealthier states while
imposing small costs on violations by developing countries. It is thus possible that no
system of monetary damages lies in the “core” of the bargaining game between North
and South, at least not as the game has been structured so far. The problem might be
overcome in future bargaining by some sort of issue linkage, but the opportunity for such
an arrangement perhaps has not yet arisen.
Is it Possible to Substitute Money Damages for Trade Sanctions? Finally, one
must reflect on the practical challenges of designing a credible system of monetary

period” amounts, sum them over time and discount to present value—the same issues arise.
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penalties to replace trade sanctions. Imagine that monetary penalties were assessed
against a violator state, which then declined to pay the judgment. What consequence
would follow? Unless nations are confident that reputation or repeat play concerns will
alone ensure respect for monetary awards—and they plainly lack confidence in these
forces to police the rest of their obligations—it seems that any system of monetary
liability would have to be backed up with the threat of trade sanctions. At the end of a
dispute, violator states would then have the opportunity to choose between paying the
assessed damages or suffering the trade retaliation that follows from non-payment. In
many ways, such a system is the mirror image of the status quo—violator states today
choose between retaliation under agreed standards for calibrating it, and negotiated
compensation, which can be monetary or anything else. It is not clear what advantage an
alternative system of monetary penalties would really offer.
To be sure, part of the problem might be avoided if trading nations posted bonds
ex ante. But this system too could quickly break down without a threat of sanctions to
induce bonds to be posted in timely fashion and to be replenished when needed.
The Mexican auction proposal, of course, does embody a blend of monetary
payments and trade retaliation. The proposal is apparently making little headway in the
WTO at large, however, perhaps because of the concern noted above—it would amount
to a sizable transfer from North to South, and may not yet lie in the core of any near-term
global bargain.
I conclude with one last point about the contrast between trade and investment. If
a threat of trade sanctions is necessary for monetary penalties to be enforceable in a trade
setting, why not also in the investment context? The answer is that an alternative threat
sits in the background of an investment agreement to induce governments to pay

37

damages, wielded by the global capital market. Any capital importing nation that defaults
on its obligations under a BIT or similar instrument will face an increased cost of capital
that lowers its welfare. Because the importing nation entered the BIT in the first place to
avoid paying such risk premia, it will typically respect a judgment against it absent some
substantial change in circumstances.
Damages in Europe and the United States. The remarks above perhaps prove too
much in light of the difference between NAFTA and the WTO on the one hand, and
Europe and the United States on the other. Damages awards in the U.S. and European
systems are sometimes available to successful plaintiffs, and are collected, without the
need for a trade sanctions regime in the background.39 The reason is likely multifaceted,
relating to the existence of a political body that sits above the member states with various
coercive options, the power of judges to order individual public officials to act and to
punish those who do not, and perhaps a stronger pull of reputation in these more deeplyintegrated systems. Monetary penalties assuredly may have more appeal, other things
being equal, where the member states can be trusted to pay them without a fight.
Conclusion
The role of private actors in the enforcement of international economic law varies
greatly between investment and trade agreements, and considerably within the trade area
as well. A private right of action for money damages is especially valuable in the
investment arena, where a key objective of the parties is to lower the cost of capital for
new, irreversible investments. Nations can cheaply achieve that objective by credibly
promising to compensate for “expropriation” and related practices, so long as those
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Recall Dennis v. Higgins in the United States and the Francovich line of cases in Europe, discussed
supra.
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practices are clearly and appropriately defined. This objective is absent in the trade area,
where trading nations will often prefer to act as “political filters” by denying standing to
private parties and thereby retaining the ability to block private enforcement actions that
can reduce joint political welfare. The existence of a political body with the capacity to
reverse politically unfortunate judicial decisions (an ex post political filter) is at least an
imperfect substitute for the denial of private standing, and will make private rights of
action more attractive, other things being equal. Finally, it is by no means clear that
private rights of action for damages would be superior to trade sanctions, or that they
could be substituted for trade sanctions as practical matter in a system such as the WTO
or NAFTA. These observations can begin to explain, in broad brush, the patchwork of
rules regarding private standing and remedies under existing investment and trade
agreements.
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